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ABSTRACT
Techniques are described herein for sophisticated authentication and encryption
methods that do not require manual configuration or a centralized server. These techniques
use blockchain and public key cryptography to exchange Media Access Control security
(MACsec) keys securely between router links and thereby by avoid manual configuration
for MACsec. This simplifies existing MACsec key configuration approaches, which use
static security mode with manually-configured security keys and dynamic security mode
with keys distributed from a centralized Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
(AAA) server over Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAPTLS).
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
For simplicity, the Asymmetric Encryption (AE) algorithm discussed herein is
represented as the key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms (KeyGeneration,
Encryption, Decryption) respectively. Similarly, the Digital Signature (DS) algorithm
discussed herein is represented as the key generation, signature, and verification algorithms
(KeyGeneration, Signature, Verification) respectively. The pair of keys used in the
algorithms are the Public Key (PK) and private (Secret) Key (SK). These are basic
requirements for public key cryptography, where SK is kept secret and PK is broadcast
over the network.
Media Access Control security (MACsec) is an Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1AE standard authenticating and encrypting mechanism
between MACsec-capable devices. MACsec allows encryption and decryption of data
packets at line-rate, and can be used on the links connecting routers. There can be many
inter-connected routers depending on the specific deployment. Each of these links
connecting routers must be manually programmed with identical key information (identical
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Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and identical Connectivity Association Key Name
(CKN)). The CAK is the secret key and should not be compromised.
There are many issues with manually programming these MACsec keys. Manual
configuration is time consuming since each port has to be programmed independently and
can be error prone. Also, the user must keep track of which ports on two routers are
physically connected and ensure they are programmed with identical key information.
Moreover, any mismatch in MACsec key information can result in the network link going
down which may affect the performance and resiliency of the network. Moreover, existing
MACsec key configuration uses static security mode wherein security keys are configured
manually, and dynamic security mode wherein keys are distributed from a centralized
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) over Extensible Authentication
Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS).
MACsec currently supports two security modes: pre-shared key security mode and
dynamic key security mode. In pre-shared key security mode, the user needs to configure
the same key across nodes manually. There are two forms of pre-shared key security mode.
The first form is Static Secure Association Key (SAK) Security Mode, where the user needs
to manually configure two SAKs across nodes of a point-to-point Ethernet link. The second
form is static CAK security mode, where the user needs to manually configure the CKN
and the CAK across nodes of the point-to-point Ethernet link. Static CAK security mode
ensures security by frequently refreshing to a new random security key and by only sharing
the security key between the two devices on the MACsec-secured point-to-point link.
However, this method is not considered robust because the user needs to configure the
CAK and the CKN.
In dynamic key security mode, the EAP-TLS mutual authentication method is used
to authenticate a supplicant (node/router) and a server (e.g., a Remote Authentication DialIn User Service (RADIUS) server) by exchanging certificates. The Master Secret Key
(MSK) and session Identifier (ID) are populated and distributed. Dynamic key security
mode avoids the aforementioned disadvantage in pre-shared key security mode, but the
RADIUS server must support the EAP-TLS authentication framework. For example, the
server must use IEEE 802.1X authentication, even when it is multiple hops from
deployment.
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Thus, one method requires manual intervention and another requires a centralized
server to distribute the MACsec keys. To overcome these disadvantages, a sophisticated
authentication and encryption method is needed that does not require manual configuration
or a centralized server. Accordingly, techniques are described herein which simplify this
process by avoiding manual configuration while providing secure and decentralized
MACsec key distribution between routers. In particular, manual intervention is removed
and key distribution is decentralized. Blockchain and public key cryptography (also
referred to as asymmetric cryptography) may be used to generate and securely distribute
MACsec keys among routers, which requires no manual configuration and provides a
decentralized (distributed) approach that does not need a centralized authority.
As described herein, routers become peers when a link is established between them.
Mutual peer authentication may take place as follows based on blockchain (or any suitable
distributed ledger). Each router may generate an SK/PK pair using public key cryptography.
The SK may be kept secret by the device that generates and sends the PK to the peer. For
authentication, the sender may use its SK to sign a message and send the message to the
receiver. The receiver may in turn use the PK shared earlier by the sender in the received
message to verify the sender.
For simplicity, notation for the signature is "DS.Signature(Private Key of the
Sender, Identification of the Sender)." Similarly, notation for the verification is
"DS.Verification(Public Key of the Sender, Identification of the Sender)." Furthermore, a
transaction having metadata is created and added to the blockchain to avoid reply attacks,
malicious key updates, etc.
In the MACsec context, routers are defined which are participating in the point-topoint link as shown below:
R1 = (ID_R1, PK_R1, SK_R1)
R2 = (ID_R2, PK_R2, SK_R2)
Here, ID_R1 and ID_R2 are the respective port/interface MAC addresses of router
R1 and router R2, PK_R1 and PK_R2 are the respective PKs of the router link, and SK_R1
and SK_R2 are the respective SKs of the router link. Sender R1 signs using SK_R1 and
router R2 performs verification using PK_R1. This may be repeated for every message sent
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from router R1 to router R2. A similar operation may be performed in the opposite direction
(from router R2 to router R1) as well.
All active histories of the routers, including operations performed when the routers
participate and act in the network, are built into metadata of transactions on blockchains as
T_R = (ID_R, PK_R, DS.Signature(SK_R, ID_R), KEY_UPDATE_R), where T_R is the
transaction ID of the router, ID_R is the identity of the router (e.g., the port/interface MAC
address of the router), PK_R is the PK of the router, SK_R is the SK of the router, and
KEY_UPDATE_R is an encrypted tuple added to the transaction used for key updating
(e.g., in case of reconnect, reboot of the router, etc.). Here, ID_R is verified by the
algorithm DS.Verification(PK_R, DS.Signature(SK_R, ID_R)) to prove that ID_R is
linked with PK_R and is registered with the blockchain. SK_R is not added to the
transaction directly, and instead the signature generated by DS.Signature() using SK_R and
ID_R is populated in the transaction.
The transactions may include transactions of registered entities that not only
effectively indicate the existences of those entities but also indicate the relationships
connecting them. For router R1 these transactions may be defined as T_R1 = (MAC_R1,
PK_R1,

DS.Signature(SK_R1,

MAC_R1),

KEY_UPDATE_R1),

where

DS_Signature(SK_R1, MAC_R1) is the digital signature signed by router R1 using its SK
(which is used for authentication), and KEY_UPDATE_R1 is the AE.Encryption(PK_R2,
nonce, DS.Signature(SK_R1, nonce)) (which is the encrypted tuple added to the
transaction used for key updating).
Similarly, for router R2 these transactions may be defined as T_R2 = (MAC_R2,
PK_R2,

DS.Signature(SK_R2,

MAC_R2),

KEY_UPDATE_R2),

where

DS_Signature(SK_R2, MAC_R2) is the digital signature signed by router R2 using its SK,
which is used for authentication, and KEY_UPDATE_R2 is the AE.Encryption(PK_R1,
nonce, DS.Signature(SK_R2, nonce)) (which is the encrypted tuple added to the
transaction used for key updating).
Table 1 below illustrates an example distributed ledger that has been updated to
include these transactions.
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Table 1

Optionally, Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) may be used to identify the
peer port (node-id and port-id). Local node-id, local port-id, peer node-id, and peer port-id
may be used to create a key-name that is unique within the deployment and add to the
transaction T_R and hence to the blockchain.
Maintaining metadata of transactions on the blockchain may help overcome reply
attacks and identity-verification challenges in the key updating phase. For example,
suppose a compromised router launches a reply attack to a legitimate router by frequently
sending its information. By auditing T_R on the blockchain, a router may refuse a replied
request when the replied identity (ID_R and PK_R) is already part of the blockchain that
stores timestamp and communication histories among the routers.
With respect to key updating, T_R also includes the tuple "KEY_UPDATE_R =
AE.Encryption(PK_R2, nonce, DS.Signature(SK_R1, nonce))," which is for encryption
using the public key of (destination) router R2. This includes a nonce selected by router R1
when the connection is first built. Specifically, when the same router R1 reconnects with
router R2, router R2 may audit the transaction T_R on the blockchain. The encrypted tuple
may be extracted from the T_R and generate an identity-verification challenge for router
R1. If router R1 can successfully respond with the correct nonce that the R2 verifies using
the encrypted value, the PK of the nonce may be equal to the value extracted from the
logged connection transaction. If so, the verification is successful and router R2 continues
to share MACsec keys CAK and CKN with router R1.
Communication between the routers R1 and R2 is secured by encrypting at sending
router R1 using PK_R2 of receiving router R2 and decrypting at receiving router R2 with
its SK_R2. Notation used herein for encryption is "Encryption_R1 = AE.Encryption(Public
Key of R2 , DS.Signature(Private Key of R1))," and notation used herein for decryption is
"Decryption_R2 = AE.Decryption(Private Key of R2, DS_Verification(Public Key of
R1))." In addition to encryption and decryption, message authentication may also be
performed by adding a signature at the sender and verifying at the receiver. For example,
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the sender may add the signature using SK_R1, and this may be verified by the receiver
using PK_R1.
Figure 1 below illustrates an example sequence diagram that shows the steps
involved between routers to exchange MACsec keys using public key cryptography.

Figure 1

This encryption and decryption method may be used to send MACsec keys between
routers. MACsec is used across nodes of a point-to-point Ethernet link. This example
considers MACsec between routers, although it will be appreciated that similar operations
are applicable between switches or between a host and a switch, for example. When
MACsec is enabled on router R1, it generates a pair of keys: SK1 and PK1. SK1 is kept
secret by router R1 and PK1 is sent to peer router R2 over an existing MACsec Key
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Agreement Protocol Data Unit (MKPDU). The transaction may be populated at R1 as
T_R1 = (ID_R1, PK_R1, DS.Signature(SK_R1, ID_R1), KEY_UPDATE_R1), and the
transaction T_R1 may be attached to the blockchain and hence to the public ledger.
Similarly, router R2 generates a pair of keys: SK2 and PK2. SK2 is kept secret by
router R2, and PK2 is sent to peer router R1 over an existing MKPDU. The transaction is
populated at router R2 as T_R2 = (ID_R2, PK_R2, DS.Signature(SK_R2, ID_R2),
KEY_UPDATE_R2). The transaction T_R2 is attached to the blockchain and hence to the
public ledger.
The router of the point-to-point link with the lowest port/interface MAC address
may be selected as the key server. In this example, router R1 is selected. Hash-based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) Key Derivation Function (HKDF) may be used to
generate a unique CAK and CKN on the selected key server R1 for this router link. HKDF
is used to derive an encryption key from a pass phrase. Initially, HKDF creates a
Pseudorandom Key (PRK) using a pass phrase and a salt value, in order to produce an
HMAC hash function (such as HMAC-SHA256), and along with a salt value. Next the
PRK output is used to produce a key of the required length. If a 16-byte output (32 hex
characters) is generated, it will generate a 128-bit key, and for a 32-byte output (64 hex
characters), it will generate a 256-bit key.
The CAK and CKN may be encrypted with the PK_R2 to generate cipher-text,
which is sent to router R2. Router R2 may decrypt the cipher-text using SK_R2 to populate
the CAK and CKN. Now both routers R1 and R2 have the CAK and CKN, and install the
CAK and CKN to the MACsec layer. Once both sides have provided the CAK and CKN
to their MACsec layer, the existing MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) may be initiated on
the router link. Upon successful MKA session creation, all data traffic may be encrypted
via MACsec between the router links.
The techniques described herein require no manual configuration for MACsec key
generation and distribution. There is also no need for a RADIUS server, which is required
for EAP-TLS. Similar methods may be used for a MACsec tunnel/session between
switches or between the host and the switch, or data centers between fabric links.
In summary, techniques are described herein for sophisticated authentication and
encryption methods that do not require manual configuration or a centralized server. These
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techniques use blockchain and public key cryptography to exchange MACsec keys
securely between router links and thereby by avoid manual configuration for MACsec.
This simplifies existing MACsec key configuration approaches, which use static security
mode with manually-configured security keys and dynamic security mode with keys
distributed from a centralized AAA server over EAP-TLS.
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